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- BPEA_final_ineq.pdf author "Gordon, R.".
- BPEA_final_ineq.pdf author2 "I. Dew-Becker".
- BPEA_final_ineq.pdf conference "Presented at Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, Washington D.C.".
- BPEA_final_ineq.pdf date "2007-09-07".
- BPEA_final_ineq.pdf isCitedBy Outrage_constraint.
- BPEA_final_ineq.pdf publisher "Department of Economics, Northwestern University".
- BPEA_final_ineq.pdf quote "Bebchuk and Fried provide a substantial amount of evidence that the principal‐agent setting cannot explain the salient facts about CEO pay. They propose an alternative model in which CEOs have control over boards of directors and are mainly restricted by an “outrage constraint” where shareholders retaliate if they perceive executive compensation to be excessive.".
- BPEA_final_ineq.pdf title "Unresolved Issues in the Rise of American Inequality".
- BPEA_final_ineq.pdf url BPEA_final_ineq.pdf.