DBpedia – Linked Data Fragments

Matches in DBpedia 2016-04 for { <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf> ?p ?o }

• GPO-FCIC.pdf accessdate "2012-10-12".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf accessdate "2013-11-05".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf accessdate "2014-02-20".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf accessdate "November 2013".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf author "The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf chapter "Chapter 2 Shadow Banking".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf date "2011-02-25".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf date "January 2011".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf format "pdf".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf isCitedBy Asset-backed_commercial_paper.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf isCitedBy Banking_in_the_United_States.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf isCitedBy Credit_Rating_Agency_Reform_Act.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf isCitedBy Credit_rating_agencies_and_the_subprime_crisis.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf isCitedBy Credit_rating_agency.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf isCitedBy Executive_compensation_in_the_United_States.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf isCitedBy Government_policies_and_the_subprime_mortgage_crisis.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf isCitedBy Moodys_Investors_Service.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf isCitedBy No_doc_loan.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf isCitedBy Residential_mortgage-backed_security.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf isCitedBy Shadow_banking_system.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf isCitedBy Stanley_ONeal.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf isCitedBy Structured_investment_vehicle.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf isCitedBy Subprime_lending.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf isCitedBy Subprime_mortgage_crisis.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf isCitedBy Synthetic_CDO.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf last "NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf location "Washington DC".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "102".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "103".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "110".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "119".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "120".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "142".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "143".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "145".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "149".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "150".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "188".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "193".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "207".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "210".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "252".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "257".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "44".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "50".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "67".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "70".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "89".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "90".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "xxiii".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "xxv".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf page "xxvi".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf pages "122".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf pages "142–3".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf pages "216–8".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf pages "221–2".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf pages "224".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf pages "228–9".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf pages "228–9, figure 11.4".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf pages "43–44".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf pages "71–2".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf pages "xxv".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf publisher United_States_Government_Publishing_Office.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf publisher "GPO".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf publisher "National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf publisher "The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf publisher "US Government Printing Office".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf quote ""commercial banks, thrifts, and investment banks caught up with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in securitizing home loans. and by 2005, had overtaken government/GSE mortgage backed securities issuance."".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf quote "Betting against CDOs was also, in some cases, a bet against the rating agencies and their models. Jamie Mai and Ben Hockett, principals at the small investment firm Cornwall Capital, told the FCIC that they had warned the SEC in 2007 that the agencies were dangerously overoptimistic in their assessment of mortgage-backed CDOs. Mai and Hockett saw the rating agencies as “the root of the mess,” because their ratings removed the need for buyers to study prices and perform due diligence, even as “there was a massive amount of gaming going on.”".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf quote "Credit default swaps were often compared to insurance: the seller was described as insuring against a default in the underlying asset. However, while similar to insurance, CDS escaped regulation by state insurance supervisors because they were treated as deregulated OTC derivatives. This made CDS very different from insurance in at least two important respects. First, only a person with an insurable interest can obtain an insurance policy. A car owner can insure only the car she owns—not her neighbor’s. But a CDS purchaser can use it to speculate on the default of a loan the purchaser does not own. These are often called “naked credit default swaps” and can inflate potential losses and corresponding gains on the default of a loan or institution. Before the CFMA was passed, there was uncertainty about whether or not state insurance regulators had authority over credit default swaps. In June 2000, in response to a letter from the law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP, the New York State Insurance Department determined that “naked” credit default swaps did not count as insurance and were therefore not subject to regulation. In addition, when an insurance company sells a policy, insurance regulators require that it put aside reserves in case of a loss. In the housing boom, CDS were sold by firms that failed to put up any reserves or initial collateral or to hedge their exposure. In the run-up to the crisis, AIG, the largest U.S. insurance company, would accumulate a one-half trillion dollar position in credit risk through the OTC market without being required to post one dollar’s worth of initial collateral or making any other provision for loss. AIG was not alone. ...".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf quote "Credit default swaps were often compared to insurance: the seller was described as insuring against a default in the underlying asset. However, while similar to insurance, CDS escaped regulation by state insurance supervisors because they were treated as deregulated OTC derivatives. This made CDS very different from insurance in at least two important respects.".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf quote "Credit ratings also determined whether investors could buy certain investments at all. The SEC restricts money market funds to purchasing “securities that have received credit ratings from any two NRSROs . . . in one of the two highest short-term rating categories or comparable unrated securities.” The Department of Labor restricts pension fund investments to securities rated A or higher. Credit ratings affect even private transactions: contracts may contain triggers that require the posting of collateral or immediate repayment, should a security or entity be downgraded. Triggers played an important role in the financial crisis and helped cripple AIG.".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf quote "Credit ratings also determined whether investors could buy certain investments at all. The SEC restricts money market funds to purchasing “securities that have received credit ratings from any two NRSROs ... in one of the two highest short-term rating categories or comparable unrated securities.” The Department of Labor restricts pension fund investments to securities rated A or higher. Credit ratings affect even private transactions: contracts may contain triggers that require the posting of collateral or immediate repayment, should a security or entity be downgraded. Triggers played an important role in the financial crisis and helped cripple AIG.".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf quote "In October 2007, the M4-M11 tranches [on one subprime mortgage backed deal the FCIC followed] were downgraded and by 2008, all the tranches were downgraded. Of all mortgage-backed securities it rated triple-A in 2006, Moody's downgraded 73% to junk.".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf quote "Participants in the securitization industry realized that they needed to secure favorable credit ratings in order to sell structured products to investors. Investment banks therefore paid handsome fees to the rating agencies to obtain the desired ratings. "The rating agencies were important tools to do that because you know the people that we were selling these bonds to had never really had any history in the mortgage business. ... They were looking for an independent party to develop an opinion," Jim Callahan told the FCIC; Callahan is CEO of PentAlpha, which services the securitization industry, and years ago he worked on some of the earliest securitizations".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf quote "Participants in the securitization industry realized that they needed to secure favorable credit ratings in order to sell structured products to investors. Investment banks therefore paid handsome fees to the rating agencies to obtain the desired ratings. “The rating agencies were important tools to do that because you know the people that we were selling these bonds to had never really had any history in the mortgage business. ... They were looking for an independent party to develop an opinion,” Jim Callahan told the FCIC; Callahan is CEO of PentAlpha, which services the securitization industry, and years ago he worked on some of the earliest securitizations".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf quote "Participants in the securitization industry realized that they needed to secure favorable credit ratings in order to sell structured products to investors. Investment banks therefore paid handsome fees to the rating agencies to obtain the desired ratings. “The rating agencies were important tools to do that because you know the people that we were selling these bonds to had never really had any history in the mortgage business. ... They were looking for an independent party to develop an opinion,” Jim Callahan told the FCIC; Callahan is CEO of PentAlpha, which services the securitization industry, and years ago he worked on some of the earliest securitizations".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf quote "Purchasers of the safer tranches got a higher rate of return than ultra-safe Treasury notes without much extra risk—at least in theory. However, the financial engineering behind these investments made them harder to understand and to price than individual loans. To determine likely returns, investors had to calculate the statistical probabilities that certain kinds of mortgages might default, and to estimate the revenues that would be lost because of those defaults. Then investors had to determine the effect of the losses on the payments to different tranches. This complexity transformed the three leading credit rating agencies—Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s , and Fitch—into key players in the process, positioned between the issuers and the investors of securities.".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf quote "The collateralized debt obligation machine could have sputtered to a natural end by the spring of 2006. Housing prices peaked, and AIG started to slow down its business of insuring subprime-mortgage CDOs.".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf quote "The three credit rating agencies were key enableers of the financial meltdown ... forces at work ... includ[e] flawed computer models, the pressure from financial firms that paid for that ratings, the relentless drive for market share, ...".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf quote "[When asked if the investment banks frequently threatened to withdraw their business if they didn’t get their desired rating, former Moody team managing director Gary Witt told the FCIC] Oh God, are you kidding? All the time. I mean, that’s routine. I mean, they would threaten you all of the time... It’s like, ‘Well, next time, we’re just going to go with Fitch and S&P.’".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf title "CONCLUSIONS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf title "FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf title "FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf title "Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf title "Financial Crisis Inquiry Report".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf title "The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf url GPO-FCIC.pdf.
• GPO-FCIC.pdf url "http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf work "NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf work "National Commission on the Causes fothe Financial and Econmic Crisis in the United States".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf year "2010".
• GPO-FCIC.pdf year "2011".