Matches in DBpedia 2015-10 for { ?s <http://dbpedia.org/property/cryptanalysis> ?o }
Showing triples 1 to 86 of
86
with 100 triples per page.
- 3-Way cryptanalysis Related-key_attack.
- ARIA_(cipher) cryptanalysis "Meet-in-the-middle attack on 8 rounds with data complexity 256".
- Advanced_Encryption_Standard cryptanalysis "Attacks have been published that are computationally faster than a full brute force attack, though none as of 2013 are computationally feasible. For AES-128, the key can be recovered with a computational complexity of 2126.1 using the biclique attack. For biclique attacks on AES-192 and AES-256, the computational complexities of 2189.7 and 2254.4 respectively apply. Related-key attacks can break AES-192 and AES-256 with complexities 2176 and 299.5, respectively.".
- Akelarre_(cipher) cryptanalysis "Susceptible to ciphertext-only attack".
- BaseKing cryptanalysis Power_analysis.
- BaseKing cryptanalysis Related-key_attack.
- Blowfish_(cipher) cryptanalysis "Four rounds of Blowfish are susceptible to a second-order differential attack ; for a class of weak keys, 14 rounds of Blowfish can be distinguished from a pseudorandom permutation .".
- CIKS-1 cryptanalysis "Differential attack using 256 chosen plaintexts".
- CLEFIA cryptanalysis "An improbable differential attack requiring 2126.83 chosen plaintexts breaks 13 rounds with a complexity of 2126.83 encryptions for the key size of length 128 bits . Similar attacks apply for 14 and 15 rounds of CLEFIA for the key sizes 192 and 256 bits, respectively.".
- COCONUT98 cryptanalysis "The differential-linear attack by Biham, et al. uses 227.7 chosen plaintexts and about 233.7 work, and has a 75.5% success rate.".
- COCONUT98 cryptanalysis "Wagner's boomerang attack uses about 216 adaptively-chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts, about 238 work, and succeeds with probability 99.96%.".
- Caesar_cipher cryptanalysis "Susceptible to frequency analysis and brute force attacks.".
- Cellular_Message_Encryption_Algorithm cryptanalysis "338".
- Chiasmus_(cipher) cryptanalysis "Secure against linear and differential cryptanalysis.".
- Cinavia cryptanalysis "Survives psychoacoustic compression models and non-destructive audio transformations and filtering.".
- Content_Scramble_System cryptanalysis "Defeated in 1999 by DeCSS, 40-bit key size is subject to brute-force attack, effective key size is about 16 bits. This can be brute-forced in about a minute by a Pentium II.".
- Crab_(cipher) cryptanalysis "Proposed differential cryptanalysis using no more than 216 chosen plaintexts".
- Crypto-1 cryptanalysis "Garcia, Flavio D.; Peter van Rossum; Roel Verdult; Ronny Wichers Schreur . "Wirelessly Pickpocketing a Mifare Classic Card"".
- Cryptomeria_cipher cryptanalysis "A boomerang attack breaks all 10 rounds in 248 time with known S-box, or 253.5 with an unknown S-box, using 244 adaptively chosen plaintexts/ciphertexts.".
- DFC_(cipher) cryptanalysis "Knudsen and Rijmen's differential attack breaks 6 rounds".
- Data_Encryption_Standard cryptanalysis "DES is now considered insecure because a brute force attack is possible . As of 2008, the best analytical attack is linear cryptanalysis, which requires 243 known plaintexts and has a time complexity of 239–43 .".
- Elliptic_curve_only_hash cryptanalysis "Second Pre-Image".
- EnRUPT cryptanalysis "2".
- EnRUPT cryptanalysis "Chosen plaintext attack with 2^15 queries against EnRUPT block cipher".
- FEA-M cryptanalysis "Youssef and Tavares break it with 1 known plaintext and 2 chosen plaintexts".
- FEAL cryptanalysis "Linear cryptanalysis can break FEAL-4 with 5 known plaintexts . A differential attack breaks FEAL-N/NX with fewer than 31 rounds .".
- FROG cryptanalysis "Differential and linear attacks against some weak keys".
- GDES cryptanalysis "differential cryptanalysis breaks most variants more easily than DES".
- GOST_(hash_function) cryptanalysis "A 2008 attack breaks the full-round hash function. The paper presents a collision attack in 2105 time, and preimage attacks in 2192 time.".
- Grøstl cryptanalysis "Collision attack on 5 rounds".
- Hierocrypt cryptanalysis "Integral attack against 3.5 rounds".
- ICE_(cipher) cryptanalysis "Differential cryptanalysis can break 15 out of 16 rounds of ICE with complexity 256. Thin-ICE can be broken using 227 chosen plaintexts with a success probability of 95%.".
- IDEA_NXT cryptanalysis "Integral attack on 7 round NXT64 with time complexity of 2237.4 and on 5 round NXT128 with time complexity of 2205.6 by Wu Wenling, Zhang Wentao, and Feng Dengguo.".
- Intel_Cascade_Cipher cryptanalysis "Specifications not published".
- International_Data_Encryption_Algorithm cryptanalysis "The key can be recovered with a computational complexity of 2126.1 using narrow bicliques. This attack is computationally faster than a full brute force attack, though not, as of 2013, computationally feasible.".
- KHAZAD cryptanalysis "No attack better than on the first five rounds is known.".
- KN-Cipher cryptanalysis "Jakobsen & Knudsen's higher order differential cryptanalysis breaks KN-Cipher with only 512 chosen plaintexts and 241 running time, or with 32 chosen plaintexts and 270 running time.".
- Khufu_and_Khafre cryptanalysis "Biham and Shamir's differential attack is faster than brute force even for 24 rounds".
- Khufu_and_Khafre cryptanalysis "Gilbert and Chauvaud's differential attack".
- Kupyna cryptanalysis "A rebound attack that presents collisions against 4 rounds of Kupyna-256 in 267 time and against 5 rounds in 2120 time.".
- LOKI97 cryptanalysis "Linear cryptanalysis against LOKI97, requiring 256 known plaintexts .".
- Ladder-DES cryptanalysis "Eli Biham's attacks require 236 plaintext-ciphertext pairs".
- M6_(cipher) cryptanalysis "Mod n cryptanalysis: 1 known plaintext allows to recover the key with about 235 trial encryptions; "a few dozen" known plaintexts reduces this to about 231".
- MD4 cryptanalysis "A collision attack published in 2007 can find collisions for full MD4 in less than 2 hash operations.".
- MD5 cryptanalysis "A 2013 attack by Xie Tao, Fanbao Liu, and Dengguo Feng breaks MD5 collision resistance in 218 time. This attack runs in less than a second on a regular computer.".
- MESH_(cipher) cryptanalysis "2".
- MISTY1 cryptanalysis "Integral cryptanalysis leading to full key recovery with 263.9999 chosen ciphertexts and 279 time, or 264 chosen ciphertexts and 269.5 time.".
- MMB cryptanalysis "Key recovery using 267 chosen plaintexts".
- Mercy_(cipher) cryptanalysis "Scott Fluhrer's differential attack breaks the cipher.".
- MultiSwap cryptanalysis "The differential cryptanalysis of Borisov, et al. requires about 213 chosen plaintexts or about 222 known plaintexts".
- NUSH cryptanalysis "A linear attack faster than exhaustive search has been found.".
- NewDES cryptanalysis "A related-key attack succeeds with 232 known plaintexts".
- New_Data_Seal cryptanalysis "Grossman & Tuckerman's slide attack uses at most 212 chosen plaintexts".
- Nimbus_(cipher) cryptanalysis "Differential cryptanalysis can break Nimbus with 256 chosen plaintexts.".
- Panama_(cryptography) cryptanalysis "Panama hash collisions can be generated in 26 time.".
- Phelix cryptanalysis "All known attacks are computationally infeasible when the cipher is used properly. If nonces are reused, a differential attack breaks the cipher with about 237 operations, 234 chosen nonces and 238.2 chosen plaintext words.".
- Q_(cipher) cryptanalysis "A linear attack succeeds with 98.4% probability using 297 known plaintexts.".
- RC2 cryptanalysis "A related-key attack is possible requiring 234 chosen plaintexts .".
- RC5 cryptanalysis "12".
- RSA_(cryptosystem) cryptanalysis "A 768-bit key has been broken".
- RSA_(cryptosystem) cryptanalysis "General number field sieve for classical computers".
- RSA_(cryptosystem) cryptanalysis "Shor's algorithm for quantum computers".
- SANDstorm_hash cryptanalysis "None".
- SC2000 cryptanalysis "Differential and linear attacks exist against SC2000 reduced to 4.5 rounds".
- SHA-1 cryptanalysis "A 2011 attack by Marc Stevens can produce hash collisions with a complexity between 260.3 and 265.3 operations. , no actual collisions are publicly known.".
- SHA-2 cryptanalysis "A 2011 attack breaks preimage resistance for 57 out of 80 rounds of SHA-512, and 52 out of 64 rounds for SHA-256. Pseudo-collision attack against up to 46 rounds of SHA-256.".
- SMASH_(hash) cryptanalysis "Collision, Second Preimage".
- SMS4 cryptanalysis "linear and differential attacks against 22 rounds".
- MBAL cryptanalysis "Differential and linear cryptanalysis".
- Salsa20 cryptanalysis "2008".
- Serpent_(cipher) cryptanalysis "All publicly known attacks are computationally infeasible, and none of them affect the full 32-round Serpent. A 2011 attack breaks 11 round Serpent with 2116 known plaintexts, 2107.5 time and 2104 memory . The same paper also describes two attacks which break 12 rounds of Serpent-256. The first requires 2118 known plaintexts, 2228.8 time and 2228 memory. The other attack requires 2116 known plaintexts and 2121 memory but also requires 2237.5 time.".
- Simon_(cipher) cryptanalysis "Differential cryptanalysis can break 46 rounds of Simon128/128 with 2125.6 data, 240.6 bytes memory and time complexity of 2125.7 with success rate of 0.632.".
- Skipjack_(cipher) cryptanalysis "ECRYPT II recommendations note that, as of 2012, ciphers with a key size of 80 bits provide only "Very short-term protection against agencies". NIST recommends not to use Skipjack after 2010. Impossible differential cryptanalysis breaks 31 rounds .".
- Speck_(cipher) cryptanalysis "Differential cryptanalysis can break 17 rounds of Speck128/128 with 2113 data, 222 bytes memory and time complexity of 2113. Rectangle attack can break 18 rounds of Speck128/192,256 with 2121.9 data, 2125.9 bytes memory and time complexity of 2182.7.".
- Spectr-H64 cryptanalysis "Slide attack using 217 chosen plaintexts".
- Streebog cryptanalysis "Second preimage attack with 2266 time complexity".
- Temporal_Key_Integrity_Protocol cryptanalysis "Deprecated".
- Tiny_Encryption_Algorithm cryptanalysis "TEA suffers from equivalent keys and can be broken using a related-key attack requiring 223 chosen plaintexts and a time complexity of 232. The best structural cryptanalysis of TEA in the standard single secret key setting is the zero-correlation cryptanalysis breaking 21 rounds in 2121.5 time with less than the full code book".
- Treyfer cryptanalysis "A slide attack using 232 known plaintexts and 244 work succeeds for any number of rounds".
- Triple_DES cryptanalysis "Lucks: 232 known plaintexts, 2113 operations including 290 DES encryptions, 288 memory; Biham: find one of 228 target keys with a handful of chosen plaintexts per key and 284 encryptions".
- Twofish cryptanalysis "Truncated differential cryptanalysis requiring roughly 251 chosen plaintexts. Impossible differential attack that breaks 6 rounds out of 16 of the 256-bit key version using 2256 steps.".
- Whirlpool_(cryptography) cryptanalysis "In 2009, a rebound attack was announced that presents full collisions against 4.5 rounds of Whirlpool in 2120 operations, semi-free-start collisions against 5.5 rounds in 2120 time and semi-free-start near-collisions against 7.5 rounds in 2128 time.".
- XTEA cryptanalysis "A related-key rectangle attack on 36 rounds of XTEA".
- XXTEA cryptanalysis "XXTEA is vulnerable to a chosen-plaintext attack requiring 259 queries and negligible work.".
- Xmx cryptanalysis "differential cryptanalysis, complementation property, weak keys".
- Zodiac_(cipher) cryptanalysis "Impossible differential cryptanalysis recovers 128-bit key in 2119 encryptions".