Matches in DBpedia 2016-04 for { <https://books.google.com/books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ> ?p ?o }
Showing triples 1 to 41 of
41
with 100 triples per page.
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ accessdate "2013-07-13".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ accessdate "2013-07-24".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ author "Benny Morris".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ isCitedBy 1948_Arab–Israeli_War.
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ isCitedBy History_of_the_Jews_in_Egypt.
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ isCitedBy Israel.
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ isCitedBy Jewish_exodus_from_Arab_and_Muslim_countries.
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ isCitedBy Mandatory_Palestine.
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ isCitedBy United_Nations_Partition_Plan_for_Palestine.
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ page "116".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ page "187".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ page "320".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ page "47".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ page "56".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ page "70".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ page "73".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ pages "45".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ pages "50, 66".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ pages "50, 66, 67, 72".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ pages "61".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ pages "66, 67, 72".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ pages "73".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ pages "75".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ publisher "Yale University Press".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ quote ""At the time, Ben-Gurion and the HGS believed that they had initiated a one-shot affair, albeit with the implication of a change of tactics and strategy on the Jerusalem front. In fact, they had set in motion a strategic transformation of Haganah policy. Nahshon heralded a shift from the defensive to the offensive and marked the beginning of the implementation of tochnit dalet —without Ben-Gurion or the HGS ever taking an in principle decision to embark on its implementation. "".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ quote ""The Arabs had failed to understand the tremendous impact of the Holocaust on the international community—and, in any event, appear to have used the selfsame methods, but with poor results. Wasif Kamal, an AHC official, for example, offered one delegate—perhaps the Russian—a “huge, huge sum of money to vote for the Arabs” . But the Arabs’ main tactic, amounting to blackmail, was the promise or threat of war should the assembly endorse partition. As early as mid-August 1947, Fawzi al-Qawuqji—soon to be named the head of the Arab League’s volunteer army in Palestine, the Arab Liberation Army —threatened that, should the vote go the wrong way, “we will have to initiate total war. We will murder, wreck and ruin everything standing in our way, be it English, American or Jewish.” It would be a “holy war,” the Arabs suggested, which might even evolve into “World War III.” Cables to this effect poured in from Damascus, Beirut, Amman, and Baghdad during the Ad Hoc Committee deliberations, becoming “more lurid,” according to Zionist officials, as the General Assembly vote drew near. The Arab states generally made no bones about their intention to support the Palestinians with “men, money and arms,” and sometimes hinted at an eventual invasion by their armies. They also threatened the Western Powers, their traditional allies, with an oil embargo and/or abandonment and realignment with the Soviet Bloc”".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ quote ""The Arabs had failed to understand the tremendous impact of the Holocaust on the international community—and, in any event, appear to have used the selfsame methods, but with poor results. Wasif Kamal, an AHC official, for example, offered one delegate—perhaps the Russian—a “huge, huge sum of money to vote for the Arabs” . But the Arabs’ main tactic, amounting to blackmail, was the promise or threat of war should the assembly endorse partition. As early as mid-August 1947, Fawzi al-Qawuqji—soon to be named the head of the Arab League’s volunteer army in Palestine, the Arab Liberation Army —threatened that, should the vote go the wrong way, “we will have to initiate total war. We will murder, wreck and ruin everything standing in our way, be it English, American or Jewish.” It would be a “holy war,” the Arabs suggested, which might even evolve into “World War III.” Cables to this effect poured in from Damascus, Beirut, Amman, and Baghdad during the Ad Hoc Committee deliberations, becoming “more lurid,” according to Zionist officials, as the General Assembly vote drew near. The Arab states generally made no bones about their intention to support the Palestinians with “men, money and arms,” and sometimes hinted at an eventual invasion by their armies. They also threatened the Western Powers, their traditional allies, with an oil embargo and/or abandonment and realignment with the Soviet Bloc”".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ quote ""The Jews were to get 62 percent of Palestine , consisting of the Negev"".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ quote ""Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Nehru’s sister, who headed the delegation, occasionally threw out hints that something might change. But Shertok was brought down to earth by historian Kavalam Panikkar, another member of the Indian delegation: “It is idle for you to try to convince us that the Jews have a case. . . . We know it. . . . But the point is simply this: For us to vote for the Jews means to vote against the Moslems. This is a conflict in which Islam is involved. . . . We have 13 million [sic] Moslems in our midst. . . . Therefore, we cannot do it."".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ quote ""p. 50,"The Arab reaction was just as predictable: “The blood will flow like rivers in the Middle East,” promised Jamal Husseini.; at 1947 "Haj Amin al-Husseini went one better: he denounced also the minority report, which, in his view, legitimized the Jewish foothold in Palestine, a “partition in disguise,” as he put it." ; p.66, at 1946 "The AHC ... insisted that the proportion of Jews to Arabs in the unitary state should stand at one to six, meaning that only Jews who lived in Palestine before the British Mandate be eligible for citizenship"".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ quote ""p73 All paid lip service to Arab unity and the Palestine Arab cause, and all opposed partition... ; p. 396 The immediate trigger of the 1948 War was the November 1947 UN partition resolution. … The Palestinian Arabs, along with the rest of the Arab world, said a flat “no”… The Arabs refused to accept the establishment of a Jewish state in any part of Palestine. And, consistently with that “no,” the Palestinian Arabs, in November–December 1947, and the Arab states in May 1948, launched hostilities to scupper the resolution’s implementation ; p. 409 The mindset characterized both the public and the ruling elites. All vilified the Yishuv and opposed the existence of a Jewish state on “their” soil, and all sought its extirpation, albeit with varying degrees of bloody-mindedness. Shouts of “Idbah al Yahud” characterized equally street demonstrations in Jaffa, Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad both before and during the war and were, in essence, echoed, usually in tamer language, by most Arab leaders. ”".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ quote "--07-23".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ quote "--07-24".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ quote "--09-01".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ quote "--09-19".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ quote "--10-14".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ quote "--11-30".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ quote "187.0".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ title "1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ url "https://books.google.com/books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ".
- books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ year "2008".