Matches in DBpedia 2016-04 for { <http://wikidata.dbpedia.org/resource/Q1414884> ?p ?o }
Showing triples 1 to 41 of
41
with 100 triples per page.
- Q1414884 subject Q7129786.
- Q1414884 subject Q8262838.
- Q1414884 abstract "Multiple realizability, in the philosophy of mind, is the thesis that the same mental property, state, or event can be implemented by different physical properties, states or events. The idea is widely believed to have its roots in the late 1960s and early 1970s when a number of philosophers, most prominently Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor, put it forth as an argument against reductionist accounts of the relation between mental and physical kinds. In short, a theory of mind that includes multiple realizability allows for the existence of strong AI. The original targets of these arguments were the type-identity theory and eliminative materialism. The same arguments from multiple realizability were also used to defend many versions of functionalism, especially Machine state functionalism.In recent years, however, multiple realizability has been used as a weapon to attack the very theory that it was originally designed to defend. Functionalism has consequently fallen out of vogue as a dominant theory in the philosophy of mind. The dominant theory ("received view" in the words of Lepore and Pylyshyn) in modern philosophy of mind is a sort of generic non-reductive physicalism and one of its central pillars is the hypothesis of multiple realizability.In addition, Restrepo noted in 2009 that the multiple realizability of the mental is a thesis Turing held at least ten years before the usually attributed authors described it. In 1950 Turing expressed the multiple realizability of the mental in this way:The [Babbage Engine's] storage was to be purely mechanical, using wheels and cards.The fact that Babbage's Analytical Engine was to be entirely mechanical will help us rid ourselves of a superstition. Importance is often attached to the fact that modern digital computers are electrical, and the nervous system is also electrical. Since Babbage's machine was not electrical, and since all digital computers are in a sense equivalent, we see that this use of electricity cannot be of theoretical importance. [...] If we wish to find such similarities we should look rather for mathematical analogies of function.".
- Q1414884 thumbnail Reduktionismus.png?width=300.
- Q1414884 wikiPageExternalLink multiple-realizability.
- Q1414884 wikiPageExternalLink multiple-realizability.
- Q1414884 wikiPageExternalLink mult-rea.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q1329497.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q1377166.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q1546801.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q180893.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q200312.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q206829.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q214070.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q2145290.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q221697.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q224180.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q23407.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q259513.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q269114.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q2703890.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q304726.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q319186.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q384522.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q4355757.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q485257.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q5054563.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q5393458.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q553870.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q5611131.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q6057209.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q660910.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q7129786.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q7251.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q8005287.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q8262838.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q849491.
- Q1414884 wikiPageWikiLink Q948647.
- Q1414884 comment "Multiple realizability, in the philosophy of mind, is the thesis that the same mental property, state, or event can be implemented by different physical properties, states or events. The idea is widely believed to have its roots in the late 1960s and early 1970s when a number of philosophers, most prominently Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor, put it forth as an argument against reductionist accounts of the relation between mental and physical kinds.".
- Q1414884 label "Multiple realizability".
- Q1414884 depiction Reduktionismus.png.