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- Epistemic_possibility abstract "In philosophy and modal logic, epistemic possibility relates a statement under consideration to the current state of our knowledge about the actual world: a statement is said to be: epistemically possible if it may be true, for all we know epistemically necessary if it is certain (or must be the case, given what we know) epistemically impossible if it cannot be true, given what we know Epistemic possibility is often contrasted with subjunctive possibility (or alethic possibility), and although epistemic and subjunctive possibilities are often expressed using the same modal terms (such as possibly, could be, must be) or similar modal terms that are sometimes confused (such as may be and might be), statements that are qualified in terms of epistemic possibility and statements that are qualified in terms of subjunctive possibility have importantly different meanings.The contrast is best explained by example. Consider the two statements: Hitler might have been victorious in World War II Hitler may have been victorious in World War IIAlthough these two statements are often confused with one another, they mean two different things: the first says something true about the vagaries of war; the second says something that is certainly false. The difference comes from the fact that the first statement—a statement of subjunctive possibility—says something about how things might have been under counterfactual conditions, whereas the second—a statement of epistemic possibility—says something about the relation between a particular outcome (a victory by Hitler) and our knowledge about the actual world (since, as it happens, we know perfectly well that that particular outcome did not actually obtain, we know that what it says is false).The parallel distinction arises between types of conditionals (if-then statements). Consider the difference between the epistemic connection expressed by an indicative conditional and the causal or metaphysical relation expressed by a subjunctive conditional: If Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy, someone else did If Oswald hadn't shot Kennedy, someone else would haveThe first statement says something that is certainly true, and will be accepted as such by anyone who is convinced that somebody shot Kennedy. It's clearly true because it expresses this epistemic relation between its antecedent (the "if"-clause) and its consequent (the "then"-clause): The antecedent, if we came to know it was true, would provide us with excellent evidence that the consequent is true. The second statement, on the other hand, expresses a causal or metaphysical relation: It says that the world was set up so that the consequent would have been made true if the antecedent were true. One will accept that second statement to the extent that one thinks the world was set up in that way. (Conspiracy theorists who think there was a back-up shooter, for instance, may accept the second statement.) Because of these differences, epistemic possibility bears on the actual world in ways that subjunctive possibility does not. Suppose, for example, that I want to know whether or not to take an umbrella before I leave. If you tell me "It's possible that it is raining outside"—in the sense of epistemic possibility—then that would weigh on whether or not I take the umbrella. But if you just tell me that "It's possible for it to rain outside"—in the sense of metaphysical possibility—then I am no better off for this bit of modal enlightenment.".
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- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink Actual_world.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink Adolf_Hitler.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink Category:Epistemology.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink Category:Modal_logic.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink Category:Possibility.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink Counterfactual_conditional.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink Hitler.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink Indicative.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink John_F._Kennedy.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink Knowledge.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink Lee_Harvey_Oswald.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink Modal_logic.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink Philosophy.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink Possible_world.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink Realis_mood.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink Subjunctive.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink Subjunctive_mood.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink Subjunctive_possibility.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLink World_War_II.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLinkText "Epistemic impossibility".
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLinkText "Epistemic possibility".
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageWikiLinkText "epistemic possibility".
- Epistemic_possibility hasPhotoCollection Epistemic_possibility.
- Epistemic_possibility wikiPageUsesTemplate Template:PhilPapers.
- Epistemic_possibility subject Category:Epistemology.
- Epistemic_possibility subject Category:Modal_logic.
- Epistemic_possibility subject Category:Possibility.
- Epistemic_possibility comment "In philosophy and modal logic, epistemic possibility relates a statement under consideration to the current state of our knowledge about the actual world: a statement is said to be: epistemically possible if it may be true, for all we know epistemically necessary if it is certain (or must be the case, given what we know) epistemically impossible if it cannot be true, given what we know Epistemic possibility is often contrasted with subjunctive possibility (or alethic possibility), and although epistemic and subjunctive possibilities are often expressed using the same modal terms (such as possibly, could be, must be) or similar modal terms that are sometimes confused (such as may be and might be), statements that are qualified in terms of epistemic possibility and statements that are qualified in terms of subjunctive possibility have importantly different meanings.The contrast is best explained by example. ".
- Epistemic_possibility label "Epistemic possibility".
- Epistemic_possibility sameAs m.05c9fb.
- Epistemic_possibility sameAs Q5383590.
- Epistemic_possibility sameAs Q5383590.
- Epistemic_possibility wasDerivedFrom Epistemic_possibility?oldid=551111283.
- Epistemic_possibility isPrimaryTopicOf Epistemic_possibility.