Matches in DBpedia 2016-04 for { ?s ?p "Type physicalism (also known as reductive materialism, type identity theory, mind-brain identity theory and identity theory of mind) is a physicalist theory, in the philosophy of mind. It asserts that mental events can be grouped into types, and can then be correlated with types of physical events in the brain. For example, one type of mental event, such as \"mental pains\" will, presumably, turn out to be describing one type of physical event (like C-fiber firings).Type physicalism is contrasted by token identity physicalism, which argues that mental events are unlikely to have \"steady\" or categorical biological correlates. These positions make use of the philosophical type–token distinction (e.g., Two persons having the same \"type\" of car need not mean that they share a \"token\", a single vehicle). Type physicalism can now be understood to argue that there is identicalness between types, whereas token identity physicalism says one can only describe a particular, unique, brain event.There are other ways a physicalist might criticize type physicalism; eliminative materialism and revisionary materialism question whether science is currently using the best categorisations. In the same way talk of demonic possession was questioned with scientific advance, categorisations like \"pain\" may need to be revised."@en }
Showing triples 1 to 1 of
1
with 100 triples per page.
- Type_physicalism abstract "Type physicalism (also known as reductive materialism, type identity theory, mind-brain identity theory and identity theory of mind) is a physicalist theory, in the philosophy of mind. It asserts that mental events can be grouped into types, and can then be correlated with types of physical events in the brain. For example, one type of mental event, such as \"mental pains\" will, presumably, turn out to be describing one type of physical event (like C-fiber firings).Type physicalism is contrasted by token identity physicalism, which argues that mental events are unlikely to have \"steady\" or categorical biological correlates. These positions make use of the philosophical type–token distinction (e.g., Two persons having the same \"type\" of car need not mean that they share a \"token\", a single vehicle). Type physicalism can now be understood to argue that there is identicalness between types, whereas token identity physicalism says one can only describe a particular, unique, brain event.There are other ways a physicalist might criticize type physicalism; eliminative materialism and revisionary materialism question whether science is currently using the best categorisations. In the same way talk of demonic possession was questioned with scientific advance, categorisations like \"pain\" may need to be revised.".