Matches in DBpedia 2016-04 for { ?s ?p "PQ 17 was the code name for an Allied Second World War convoy in the Arctic Ocean. In July 1942, the Arctic convoys suffered a significant defeat when Convoy PQ 17 lost 24 of its 35 merchant ships during a series of heavy enemy daylight attacks which lasted a week. The German success was possible through German signals intelligence (SIGINT) and cryptological analysis. On 27 June, the ships sailed eastbound from Hvalfjord, Iceland for the port of Arkhangelsk, Soviet Union. The convoy was located by German forces on 1 July, after which it was shadowed continuously and attacked. The convoy's progress was being observed by the British Admiralty. First Sea Lord Admiral Dudley Pound, acting on information that German surface units, including the German battleship Tirpitz, were moving to intercept, ordered the covering force away from the convoy and told the convoy to scatter. However, due to vacillation by the German high command, the Tirpitz raid never materialised. The convoy was the first joint Anglo-American naval operation under British command in the war.As the close escort and the covering cruiser forces withdrew westward to intercept the presumed German raiders, the individual merchant ships were left without their escorting destroyers. In their ensuing attempts to reach the appointed Russian ports, the merchant ships were repeatedly attacked by Luftwaffe aeroplanes and U-boats. Of the initial 35 ships, only 11 reached their destination, delivering 70,000 short tons (64,000 t) of cargo. The disastrous outcome of the convoy demonstrated the difficulty of passing adequate supplies through the Arctic, especially during the summer period of perpetual daylight."@en }
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- Convoy_PQ_17 abstract "PQ 17 was the code name for an Allied Second World War convoy in the Arctic Ocean. In July 1942, the Arctic convoys suffered a significant defeat when Convoy PQ 17 lost 24 of its 35 merchant ships during a series of heavy enemy daylight attacks which lasted a week. The German success was possible through German signals intelligence (SIGINT) and cryptological analysis. On 27 June, the ships sailed eastbound from Hvalfjord, Iceland for the port of Arkhangelsk, Soviet Union. The convoy was located by German forces on 1 July, after which it was shadowed continuously and attacked. The convoy's progress was being observed by the British Admiralty. First Sea Lord Admiral Dudley Pound, acting on information that German surface units, including the German battleship Tirpitz, were moving to intercept, ordered the covering force away from the convoy and told the convoy to scatter. However, due to vacillation by the German high command, the Tirpitz raid never materialised. The convoy was the first joint Anglo-American naval operation under British command in the war.As the close escort and the covering cruiser forces withdrew westward to intercept the presumed German raiders, the individual merchant ships were left without their escorting destroyers. In their ensuing attempts to reach the appointed Russian ports, the merchant ships were repeatedly attacked by Luftwaffe aeroplanes and U-boats. Of the initial 35 ships, only 11 reached their destination, delivering 70,000 short tons (64,000 t) of cargo. The disastrous outcome of the convoy demonstrated the difficulty of passing adequate supplies through the Arctic, especially during the summer period of perpetual daylight.".
- Q689123 abstract "PQ 17 was the code name for an Allied Second World War convoy in the Arctic Ocean. In July 1942, the Arctic convoys suffered a significant defeat when Convoy PQ 17 lost 24 of its 35 merchant ships during a series of heavy enemy daylight attacks which lasted a week. The German success was possible through German signals intelligence (SIGINT) and cryptological analysis. On 27 June, the ships sailed eastbound from Hvalfjord, Iceland for the port of Arkhangelsk, Soviet Union. The convoy was located by German forces on 1 July, after which it was shadowed continuously and attacked. The convoy's progress was being observed by the British Admiralty. First Sea Lord Admiral Dudley Pound, acting on information that German surface units, including the German battleship Tirpitz, were moving to intercept, ordered the covering force away from the convoy and told the convoy to scatter. However, due to vacillation by the German high command, the Tirpitz raid never materialised. The convoy was the first joint Anglo-American naval operation under British command in the war.As the close escort and the covering cruiser forces withdrew westward to intercept the presumed German raiders, the individual merchant ships were left without their escorting destroyers. In their ensuing attempts to reach the appointed Russian ports, the merchant ships were repeatedly attacked by Luftwaffe aeroplanes and U-boats. Of the initial 35 ships, only 11 reached their destination, delivering 70,000 short tons (64,000 t) of cargo. The disastrous outcome of the convoy demonstrated the difficulty of passing adequate supplies through the Arctic, especially during the summer period of perpetual daylight.".