Matches in DBpedia 2016-04 for { ?s ?p "Harold Keith \"Johnny\" Johnson (February 22, 1912 – September 24, 1983) was Chief of Staff of the United States Army from 1964 to 1968. Regarded as a premier tactician, Johnson became skeptical that the level of resources given to the Vietnam War, much of which went into 'find, fix, and destroy the big main force units' operations, could deliver victory. Johnson came to believe that the Communist forces held a trump card, because they controlled whether there were engagements with US forces, giving an option to simply avoid battle with US forces if the situation warranted it.As Johnson saw it, the main force and NVA units would always keep their casualties below what they considered a prohibitive level, and could not be swept away by US firepower. He did, however, acknowledge that Commander William Westmoreland had little choice but to engage the enemy's main formations, which had to be prevented from securing base areas where they could concentrate. Johnson was instrumental in altering the focus to a counterinsurgency approach, but was frustrated at the US government refusal to provide the manpower necessary for successful pacification. In his later years Johnson said it had been obvious that US national mobilization was required to win in Vietnam, and he regretted not resigning in protest at the government asking the army to fight a war without hope of ultimate victory."@en }
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- Harold_Keith_Johnson abstract "Harold Keith \"Johnny\" Johnson (February 22, 1912 – September 24, 1983) was Chief of Staff of the United States Army from 1964 to 1968. Regarded as a premier tactician, Johnson became skeptical that the level of resources given to the Vietnam War, much of which went into 'find, fix, and destroy the big main force units' operations, could deliver victory. Johnson came to believe that the Communist forces held a trump card, because they controlled whether there were engagements with US forces, giving an option to simply avoid battle with US forces if the situation warranted it.As Johnson saw it, the main force and NVA units would always keep their casualties below what they considered a prohibitive level, and could not be swept away by US firepower. He did, however, acknowledge that Commander William Westmoreland had little choice but to engage the enemy's main formations, which had to be prevented from securing base areas where they could concentrate. Johnson was instrumental in altering the focus to a counterinsurgency approach, but was frustrated at the US government refusal to provide the manpower necessary for successful pacification. In his later years Johnson said it had been obvious that US national mobilization was required to win in Vietnam, and he regretted not resigning in protest at the government asking the army to fight a war without hope of ultimate victory.".