Matches in DBpedia 2016-04 for { ?s ?p "De Lille and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly, an important case in South African constitutional law, was heard in the Cape Provincial Division from April 3 to 7, 1998, with judgment handed down on May 8. It was subsequently confirmed, on appeal, by the Supreme Court of Appeal.The High Court dealt with the issue of the powers of Parliament and parliamentary privilege, and found that such powers and privilege, to the extent of their inconsistency or incompatibility with the Constitution, are invalid. Where the privilege breaches the provisions of the Constitution, the aggrieved party is entitled to seek redress from the courts, to which is entrusted the task of ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution.The certificate issued by the Speaker in terms of section 5 of the Powers and Privileges of Parliament Act had the effect of undermining the independence of the courts and interfering with their functioning. Section 5, therefore, was unconstitutional to the extent that it purported to place parliamentary privilege beyond judicial scrutiny, and thus beyond the supreme Constitution, on the mere ipse dixit of the Speaker.Nor, the court found, does Parliament have the power to act mala fide. The Constitution was not intended to authorise bias on the part of Parliament.In particular, section 57(1)(a) of the Constitution does not embrace the power to suspend a Member of Parliament as punishment for contempt. Such suspension, the court found, was inconsistent with the requirements of representative democracy, because it penalised not only the Member or her party, but also the electorate which voted for that party. The punishment of suspension, therefore, was unreasonable and unjustifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality, and accordingly failed the limitations test set in section 36 of the Constitution. In this regard, the court found also that parliamentary privilege does not qualify as a law of general application for the purposes of section 36.Finally, the High Court noted that section 58(1) of the Constitution, providing for freedom of speech in Parliament, was an absolute freedom, subject only to the rules and orders of the National Assembly, and that it was not a right subject to the limitations clause in section 36.The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) dismissed an appeal against the ruling of the High Court, but on narrower grounds. It noted that no national legislation or Rules or orders of Parliament provided for the suspension of a Member where she was not obstructing or disrupting or unreasonably impeding the management of orderly business within the Assembly, but merely making a non-obstructive and non-disruptive speech. Such a suspension, accordingly, had no constitutional authority, and was therefore void."@en }
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- De_Lille_v_Speaker_of_the_National_Assembly abstract "De Lille and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly, an important case in South African constitutional law, was heard in the Cape Provincial Division from April 3 to 7, 1998, with judgment handed down on May 8. It was subsequently confirmed, on appeal, by the Supreme Court of Appeal.The High Court dealt with the issue of the powers of Parliament and parliamentary privilege, and found that such powers and privilege, to the extent of their inconsistency or incompatibility with the Constitution, are invalid. Where the privilege breaches the provisions of the Constitution, the aggrieved party is entitled to seek redress from the courts, to which is entrusted the task of ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution.The certificate issued by the Speaker in terms of section 5 of the Powers and Privileges of Parliament Act had the effect of undermining the independence of the courts and interfering with their functioning. Section 5, therefore, was unconstitutional to the extent that it purported to place parliamentary privilege beyond judicial scrutiny, and thus beyond the supreme Constitution, on the mere ipse dixit of the Speaker.Nor, the court found, does Parliament have the power to act mala fide. The Constitution was not intended to authorise bias on the part of Parliament.In particular, section 57(1)(a) of the Constitution does not embrace the power to suspend a Member of Parliament as punishment for contempt. Such suspension, the court found, was inconsistent with the requirements of representative democracy, because it penalised not only the Member or her party, but also the electorate which voted for that party. The punishment of suspension, therefore, was unreasonable and unjustifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality, and accordingly failed the limitations test set in section 36 of the Constitution. In this regard, the court found also that parliamentary privilege does not qualify as a law of general application for the purposes of section 36.Finally, the High Court noted that section 58(1) of the Constitution, providing for freedom of speech in Parliament, was an absolute freedom, subject only to the rules and orders of the National Assembly, and that it was not a right subject to the limitations clause in section 36.The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) dismissed an appeal against the ruling of the High Court, but on narrower grounds. It noted that no national legislation or Rules or orders of Parliament provided for the suspension of a Member where she was not obstructing or disrupting or unreasonably impeding the management of orderly business within the Assembly, but merely making a non-obstructive and non-disruptive speech. Such a suspension, accordingly, had no constitutional authority, and was therefore void.".
- Q5244583 abstract "De Lille and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly, an important case in South African constitutional law, was heard in the Cape Provincial Division from April 3 to 7, 1998, with judgment handed down on May 8. It was subsequently confirmed, on appeal, by the Supreme Court of Appeal.The High Court dealt with the issue of the powers of Parliament and parliamentary privilege, and found that such powers and privilege, to the extent of their inconsistency or incompatibility with the Constitution, are invalid. Where the privilege breaches the provisions of the Constitution, the aggrieved party is entitled to seek redress from the courts, to which is entrusted the task of ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution.The certificate issued by the Speaker in terms of section 5 of the Powers and Privileges of Parliament Act had the effect of undermining the independence of the courts and interfering with their functioning. Section 5, therefore, was unconstitutional to the extent that it purported to place parliamentary privilege beyond judicial scrutiny, and thus beyond the supreme Constitution, on the mere ipse dixit of the Speaker.Nor, the court found, does Parliament have the power to act mala fide. The Constitution was not intended to authorise bias on the part of Parliament.In particular, section 57(1)(a) of the Constitution does not embrace the power to suspend a Member of Parliament as punishment for contempt. Such suspension, the court found, was inconsistent with the requirements of representative democracy, because it penalised not only the Member or her party, but also the electorate which voted for that party. The punishment of suspension, therefore, was unreasonable and unjustifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality, and accordingly failed the limitations test set in section 36 of the Constitution. In this regard, the court found also that parliamentary privilege does not qualify as a law of general application for the purposes of section 36.Finally, the High Court noted that section 58(1) of the Constitution, providing for freedom of speech in Parliament, was an absolute freedom, subject only to the rules and orders of the National Assembly, and that it was not a right subject to the limitations clause in section 36.The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) dismissed an appeal against the ruling of the High Court, but on narrower grounds. It noted that no national legislation or Rules or orders of Parliament provided for the suspension of a Member where she was not obstructing or disrupting or unreasonably impeding the management of orderly business within the Assembly, but merely making a non-obstructive and non-disruptive speech. Such a suspension, accordingly, had no constitutional authority, and was therefore void.".